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Abstract—Cybersecurity lessons have not been learnt from the
dawn of other technological industries. In robotics, the existing
insecurity landscape needs to be addressed immediately. Several
manufacturers profiting from the lack of general awareness are
systematically ignoring their responsibilities by claiming their
insecure (open) systems facilitate system integration, disregarding
the safety, privacy and ethical consequences that their (lack of)
actions have. In an attempt to raise awareness and illustrate the
”insecurity by design in robotics” we have created Akerbeltz,
the first known instance of industrial robot ransomware. Our
malware is demonstrated using a leading brand for industrial
collaborative robots, Universal Robots. We describe the rationale
behind our target and discuss the general flow of the attack
including the initial cyber-intrusion, lateral movement and later
control phase. We urge security researchers to adopt some sort
of disclosure policy that forces manufacturers to react promptly.
We advocate against security by obscurity and encourage the
release of similar actions once vulnerability reports fall into a
dead-end. Actions are now to be taken to abide a future free of
zero-days for robotics.
I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
In the context of computer security, ransomware is mali-
cious software (malware) that either locks a computer, prevents
from accessing the data using encryption, or both, until the
subject has paid a ransom. First ransomware Proof of Concept
(PoC) appeared in 1989 [1], [2] when Joseph Popp, an
evolutionary biologist and AIDS researcher, carried out an
experimental attack by distributing 20,000 floppy disks in
a Conference by the World Health Organization focused in
AIDS research. The conference spanned to researchers from
more than 90 countries, and malware was distributed claiming
that the disks contained a program that analyzed risk of
acquiring AIDS through the use of a questionnaire. Thereafter,
ransomware called ”AIDS Trojan” got distributed. Since then,
it has evolved leading into two big subgroups:
• Crypto ransomware: which encrypts data and asks the
user for a ransom in exchange for the decryption key.
• Locker ransomware: locks the system by some means,
prevents its use and asks for a ransom to re-enable it.
According to literature [1], from 1989 to 2007 ransomware
instances mostly focused on crypto-ransomware. In 2007,
locker-ransomware began to appear and went mainstream.
These ransomware instances locked systems and intimidated
by displaying certain content (mostly pornographic images)
while demanding a ransom to remove such content and
unlock the systems. In 2013, Richardson et al. [1] observed
that attackers pivot back to crypto-ransomware. According
to the authors, the most famous piece of ransomware was
released in August 2013. Named as CryptoLocker, it was
originally distributed via a botnet and later through e-mail.
CryptoLocker used private and public cryptographic keys
to encrypt the target’s file. Decrypting the files required to
pay a ransom of 2 bitcoins (100 $ at the time) within the
first three days. To the extent of our literature review and to
date, variations of CryptoLocker remain being the most wide
spread instances of ransomware [3], [4].
In robotics, no targeted malware has yet been observed
out of the PoC phase. Cesar Cerrudo and Lucas Apa earlier
[5], [6] published a ransomware attack over Nao, a social
robot by Softbank Robotics, which got the media attention.
According to research being conducted on the security
concerns of the robotic market1, only 9 % of robotics
users have witnessed a cyber attack. This preliminary figure
indicates that there is still very little activity yet known to
the general public however, according to the same source, 51
% of the users inquired confirmed having identified security
flaws in robotic systems which leads to consider that there
exists a relevant landscape of insecurities. Confirming this
hypothesis, users inquired assigned a rating of 8 out 10 to the
security relevance in robotics yet only 26 % of the inquired
acknowledged to have invested in robot cybersecurity, which
includes evaluating security and protecting existing robot
setups. Therefore, it seems that robot users do not fully
apprehend the insecurity by design governing robots in the
market.
In this paper we aim to illustrate the existing insecurity
status in some robotics vendors [7]. We have selected one of
the most popular industrial collaborative robots and present
Akerbeltz, an instance of ransomware targeting industrial
robotic systems. We present the PoC ransomware attack,
describe the rationale behind our target and discuss the
general flow of the attack including the initial cyber-intrusion,
lateral movement and later control phase. We then briefly
discuss the resulting consequences from the installation of
Akerbeltz and wrap up by sharing some major conclusions.
1https://news.aliasrobotics.com/robot-security-survey-displays-first-results/
for more details on the ongoing survey.
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II. AKERBELTZ
In basque mythology, Akerbeltz is an antique deity
impersonated in a male goat which is the animal-kind
protector. Ethimologically coming from the Basque works
Aker (male goat) and Beltz (black), its origin is attributed to a
meadow in the surroundings of Zugarramurdi caves (Navarra),
a pligrimage place for Basque Mythology. Akerbeltz is the
demon that is chairing ”Akelarres” or Basque witch (sorginak)
meetings. Some authors note that the mythological figure
Akerbeltz represents was adored in many European countries,
some of which remain up to present day. Akerbeltz often
shows two different faces. On the one hand, it is the protector
of animals and is even able to heal their illnesses if needed.
Indeed, belief on Akerbeltz is thought to be the origin of
hosting a black goat as the protector of all animals within
a ”Baserri” (Basque cottage or farm). On the other hand,
when Akerbeltz participated Akelarres, it showed his darkest
face, where witches obeyed and adored him as the genius
representing revolution against established status-quo, amidst
banquets of human flesh.
We advocate for a change in (most) robot manufacturer’s
attitude towards security and to do so, we take Akerbeltz as
inspiration and present below the first instance of industrial
robotic ransomware. Due to our concerns about malicious
applications of the software, authors will not be releasing the
source code nor the low level method of operation of this
industrial robot ransomware.
A. Target selection and rationale
Our target was selected based on the results obtained
from prior research [8], [9] on the vulnerability landscape
across several industrial robot manufacturers. Our critical
attitude was previously introduced by Alzola-Kirschgens
et al. [8] and essentially builds on the fact that several
robot manufacturers, particularly collaborative robot (cobot)
vendors, are profiting the popularity of these devices, via
third parties (distributors and integrators) totally disregarding
the ethical consequences of not caring about security, to the
point that security vulnerabilities are left unadressed, or ”up
to the end user”. To further understand our viewpoint, we ask
the reader and potential robot users to consider the following
questions: Thousands of insecure robots are being deployed
all around the world, some of them thought to be networked
and to increasingly collaborate with humans, who will be held
responsible when these security holes get exploited and cause
human damages? How would robot vendors respond when
these reported, non-patched and public vulnerabilities cause
safety hazards? Would they continue claiming that ”their
robots are designed to be open” and thereby never meant to
be used beyond research? Should authorities regulate the use
of these devices and their corresponding incomplete standards?
The authors discussed on all the above and coherently,
decided to select what arguably is the most popular
collaborative industrial robot manufacturer: Universal Robots.
We select one of their best-selling robots, the UR3 and
implement our PoC on it. Figure 1 shows a picture of our
target together with the control box and teach pendant.
Fig. 1: Universal Robots UR3.
Before our work, Universal Robots had other groups
assessing their insecurity. In 2017, Cerrudo and Apa
reported [5], [6] five 0-day vulnerabilities. Several months
later, representatives from the vendor acknowledged that
security patches had been applied [10] yet to the best of
our knowledge, no public related information is available.
Instead, the vendor disregarded the previously reported
issues under the claim that attackers required very specific
conditions. Further to that, Jacob Bom Madsen, Software
Product Manager at Universal Robots publicly claimed that
Universal Robots is ”proud to have a fairly open architecture,
that allows system integrators and UR+ Partners to easily
develop and integrate the solutions they need.”. This attitude
conflicts directly with the very principle of Universal Robots
safety claims, previously highlighted by Cerrudo and Apa
[6]: ”Do not change anything in the safety configuration of
the software (e.g. the force limit). If any safety parameter is
changed the complete robot system shall be considered new,
meaning that the overall safety approval process, including
risk assessment, shall be updated accordingly”. In other
words, any modifications of the safety setup in the UR3 will
lead to the complete invalidation of the robots’ compliance
with ISO 10218-1 [11] incurring in potential relevant losses
and conflicts for the end user. Beyond the human and
economical damages caused by modifying the safety setup
of the UR3, the claim by Madsen leads to a troubling an
arguably unethical statement: ”The lack of security facilitates
system integration”. We have seen this statement repeatedly
and yet, once again, this time coming from a leading cobot
vendor, we see how openness and feature inclusion is used
to justify the lack of security. Wielding the interoperability
pitch, vendors push security up to their partners, collaborators
or ultimately, to ”the community” avoiding security actions,
critical for the use of these products in human environments.
At the time of writing, our team knows yet of no security patch
mitigating these vulnerabilities. Moreover, we performed a
penetration testing assessment in the UR3 CB series robot
confirming the still unpatched existence of several of the
previously reported flaws. Furthermore, we found more than
300 new vulnerabilities of relevant severity according to
robot-specific scoring mechanisms [12]. The overall picture
depicts a vendor which shows the little care not only for
security, but also for quality of software.
The following subsection elaborates on how Akerbeltz
acts on our UR3 CB series.
B. Ransomware’s flow
1) Cyber intrusion: Initial infection gets realised by ex-
ploiting unpatched vulnerabilities in the robot. Akerbeltz’s
initial cyber intrusion is implemented exploiting these well
known vulnerabilities and deployed via one of the following
two attack vectors:
• physical USB ports in the teach pendant: Exploiting
CVE-2019-196262 an attacker can execute malicious
code with root privileges by simply connecting an ex-
ternal USB stick. This attack vector is likely the easiest
to implement given the exposure of the teach pendant
in most UR3 robots. Moreover, the same attack vector
applies not only in the teach pendant but also in the
control box which exposes internal USB ports that can
be accessed with standard mechanical fixations.
• remote access via adjacent networks: RVD#672
(CVE-2018-10633) permits an adjacent network attacker
to easily ssh into the control box. Alternatively, RVD#6
allows an adjacent attacker to exploit a stack-based
buffer overflow in the UR3 ModBus TCP service, and
execute commands as root equally fulfilling the cyber
intrusion. Akerbeltz can be configured to exploit these
flaws and take action over industrial LANs.
2) Lateral movement: Since the cyber-intrusion allowed to
obtain root privileges in the control box, no privilege escalation
phase is necessary within Akerbeltz. The ”open” architecture
of the robot facilitates lateral movement to other sub-devices
within the robot. We briefly explored such setup and found that
it is trivial to access the robot user interface, the PolyScope.
Figure 2 shows a preview of the ransomware’s message in the
teach pendant:
The UR3 lack of security allows for additional lateral
movement. Both the BIOS of the robot controller and
the safety PLC are easily accessible and exposed. While
it remains beyond the scope of our study, we argue that
targeting any of these systems (or both together) will likely
lead to malware that could damage the robot to a point of no
return and would likely be matter of future security research.
3) Control:
• Locking: In our PoC, our team was able to lock the
whole system while displaying a message (refer to Figure
2Remains confidential for responsible disclosure reasons at the time of
writing
Fig. 2: UR3 PolyScope Robot User Interface hijacked. In
this case, Akerbeltz locks and disables most functions and
a message is overlayed on top.
1) after booting, using previously mentioned CVEs, we
managed to access the control box, acquire root privi-
leges, disable the default safety configuration and change
the default user and password. We also identified and
disabled several open ports used to control the robot from
the outside, blocking other mechanisms to reestablish
normal operation. Our work with Akerbeltz finalized by
performing some minor and non-exhaustive hardening,
meant to avoid users to unlock the system.
• Encrypting: After identifying most of the critical files
used for the control of the robot, we located previous
programs and IP deployed within the control box. These
files are encrypted using the local pgp binary in combi-
nation with a series of robot-specific identifiers.
C. Discussion
In an attempt to responsibly disclose and mitigate the
existing flaws, we generated a series of reports for selected
vulnerabilities and approached the manufacturer by e-mail.
To this date, no formal answer with intention to establish
discussions on security has been received. In a second attempt,
making use of well established and de facto approaches in
security, we filed for a CVE identifier in one of the new
discovered vulnerabilities. At the time of writing, no formal
communication has been established via this channel either.
In a third attempt, the PoC attack was disclosed to Universal
Robots directly, in a public robotics industrial conference, the
ROS-Industrial Conference in Europe (Stuttgart, December
2019). While maintaining the vulnerabilities undisclosed, we
publicly presented3 to the vendor and the rest of the audience
the consequences of their insecurity. We briefly presented
Akerbeltz and followed with a possible solution to mitigate
existing flaws in their robots.
The deployment of Akerbeltz in a UR3 via the physical
3Recording of the talk is available at https://youtu.be/J5-8ptUT9qU?t=
27052.
attack vector has been recorded and made available at
https://youtu.be/VF7fcV5j1t0 arguing that by making this
public and available we finally call to a reaction of this
particular vendor or its associated value chain.
Last but not least, our final discussion point is that these
kind of targeted attacks have the potential to spread rapidly
and across the use cases in which the Universal Robots
CB-series are deployed. Given the low complexity of the
attack, the easiness of programming on top of Universal
Robots programming environment and the relative high cost
of the assets involved, a series of attacks on this taxonomy
are foreseen.
III. CONCLUSIONS
The current insecurity status in robotics allows for malware
to be created easily and rapidly by simply evaluating known
vulnerabilities. These pieces of malware could be used and
exploited by malicious actors to gain economic profits via
extorsion. In this paper we presented Akerbeltz, a piece of
ransomware that locks and encrypts industrial collaborative
robots from Universal Robots. After the targeted attack, the
result is rendering the industrial robot totally useless, losing
IP within the robot and potentially leading to economical
losses and human or environmental damages. We described
and prototyped Akerbeltz for the UR3 CB series robot which
could be introduced following physical or network based
attacks on zero-day vulnerabilities.
At the time of writing, Universal Robots has yet to
answer our vulnerability reports, which in some cases provide
the manufacturer relevant insights on how to mitigate the
most relevant flaws exploited by the attack. As a particular
example, for the physical attack vector we exploited in
Akerbeltz, a possible mitigation involves the validation and
sanitization of specific files as well as the implementation
of Discretionary Access Control (DAC) model by providing
Mandatory Access Control (MAC) within the control box.
This will limit the programs’ capabilities with per-program
profiles (e.g. via AppArmor).
When asked directly, face to face, representatives of the
vendor, they indicated once again that their robot ”is designed
to be open” or that we are ”disabling features” and therefore,
”it’s just normal”. We would like to express our strong
concern for a reiterated lack of security actions. While our
team did not explore malicious attacks or their profitability
on the robot any further, we argue that a more aggressive
individual or group, with bad intentions, might easily
come up with some sort of ”self-destructing” malware (by
disabling safety and repeatedly crossing the boundaries of
the kinematics model and hitting itself) or worse, a ”human
or environment damaging” one, or any other kind of creative
exploits on top of the vulnerabilities exploited by Akerbeltz.
The lack of communication from the vendor’s perspective
makes us guess that, at best, there is security by obscurity
around Universal Robots. Once again as we did in the past,
we argue against this and advocate for a proactive interaction
of robot manufacturers with security researchers.
Future work on our side will involve the extension of
Akerbeltz and the development of RIS (Robot Immune
System), an ad-hoc intrusion detection system, available for
use in Universal Robots, that further monitors on top of
vulnerabilities and prevents existing flaws to be exploited.
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